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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
EDWARD G. ROBICHAUX, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16667 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was charged with one count of theft 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-404 (1953), as 
amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
on August 6, 1979, in Third Judicial District Court, the Hon-
orable Peter F. Leary, presiding. The Trial Court sentenced 
appellant to an indeterminate term of not less than one nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. The appel-
lant was granted a stay of execution of the sentence upon the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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condition that he serve ninety days in the Salt Lake 
County Jail and pay restitution to the complainant in 
an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole. The execution of the ninety-day 
jail sentence was suspended, pending the outcome of this 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an order of this Court, 
affirming the judgment of the jury at trial and the sen-
tence of the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the summer of 1975, the appellant, Dave Fel-
ger, and three other men, formed North American Financial 
Corporation. One of the projects of the corporation was 
a real estate development called Foxbridge. Appellant's 
chief responsibility in the corporation was to obtain foo~ 
ing for Foxbridge. (T. 226) Appellant approached Deseret 
Federal Savings and Loan about obtaining a loan. (T.182) 
to the tight money market, appellant had, on· previous oc· 
casions, obtained certificates of deposit (hereinafter CD'! 
which were placed in lending institutions to encourage tl~ 
to make loans. (T.182-83) Appellant represented to Felger 
f d . g ic that it would be necessary to obtain CD's to get un in 
Foxbridge. (T.126-27) 
-2-
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Accordingly, on September 3, 1975, Felger ob-
tained a second mortgage on a home he owned. (T.125) 
A Cashier's Check for $11,700 was made payable to the 
appellant. (T.126) Appellant told Felger he would be 
repaid out of the appellant's fee when funding for Fox-
bridge was obtained. (T.128, 161) On the same day, ap-
pellant Felger and Ed Eldredge drove to Zions First Na-
tional Bank in downtown Salt Lake City where appellant was 
to transfer $11,700 to a New York City bank, which would 
dispense certificates of deposit to be placed with Deseret 
Federal Savings and Loan. (T.127, 170) Appellant and El-
dredge entered the bank while Felger waited in the car. 
(T.129) Upon returning to the car, appellant told Felger 
"everything was taken care of." (T.130) 
On September 3, 1975, appellant opened a personal 
account with an initial deposit of $11,000 (State's Exhibit 
11-P) and obtained $700 in cash (Exhibit 12-P). On that 
same day, he gave Eldredge a check for $4,680 from the ac-
count. CT.172, Exhibit 13-P) Within two weeks, appellant 
had expended nearly $11,000 from the account. (Exhibits 
13-P through 18-P) 
No certificates of deposit were obtained for place-
ment with Deseret Federal Savings and Loan. (T.175) No 
-3-
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funding was received through that bank, and Felger has 
not recovered any of the $11,700 given to appellant. 
(T.131) North American Financial Corporation subsequently 
dissolved, and the funding for Foxbridge was obtained 
through another source. (T. 2 32) 
The trial judge instructed the jury on all ele-
ments of the crime of theft. He further instructed the 
jury that, since intent is not always susceptible of di-
rect proof, it must ordinarily be inferred from acts, ~~ 
duct, statements and circumstances. Accordingly, the 
Court stated the law presumes a person intends the reaso~ 
able and ordinary consequences of his own acts. The Court 
added that this presumption could be overcome by evidence 
to the contrary. The Trial Court further instructed th~ 
no person could be found guilty of an offense unless his 
conduct was prohibited by law and he acted intentionally 
or knowingly. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS PROPER TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT 
THE LAW PRESUMES A PERSON INTENDS THE 
REASONABLE AND ORDINARY CONSEQUENCES OF 
HIS ACTS. 
It is well established that the prosecution in 
a criminal case has the burden of proving all elements of 
-4-
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the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden was 
reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court in In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), as follows: 
Lest there be any doubt about the con-
stitutional stature of the reasonable 
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that 
the Due Process Clause protects the ac-
cused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which he is charged. 
397 U.S. at 364. Accordingly, the only burden placed upon 
the defendant in any criminal case is to present evidence 
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about his guilt in 
the minds of the jurors. Commenting upon the weight of 
evidence required to raise a defense, this Court observed: 
... it is to be kept in mind that the burden 
of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt is always upon the state 
both initially and ultimately. Therefore, 
the only requirement on the defense 
is that it be sufficient to raise a reason-
able doubt. 
State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 1975). 
The principal issue in the present case was 
whether the appellant acted with the requisite intent to 
be guilty of theft. In order to prove intent, the State 
was required to show appellant had the "purpose to per-
manently deprive another of his property." The appellant 
-5-
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objects to a portion of Jury Instruction No. 6, which 
reads: 
Intent or purpose, being a state of mind 
is not always susceptible of proof by di~ 
rect and positive evidence and must or-
dinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, 
statements and circumstances. The law pre-
sumes that a person intends the reasonable 
and ordinary circumstances of his own acts. 
However, this presumption is a rebuttable 
presumption and may be overcome by evidence to 
the contrary. 
Appellant contends that this language could be 
interpreted by the jury as requiring the defense to prove 
absence of intent. Thus, the appellant claims this in-
struction relieved the prosecution from the burden of 
proving all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt in violation of due process guarantees. Respondent 
rejects the contention and asserts that the instruction was 
proper. 
This Court recognized the value of making reason· 
able inferences from proven facts in State v. Peterson, 22 
Utah 2d 377, 453 P.2d 696 (1969). The defendant in that 
case was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon wiili ~ 
tent to do bodily harm. On appeal, defendant contended tha 
the intent to do bodily injury was not sufficiently establi 
by the proven fact that defendant made a slashing motion 
-6-
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toward his victim with a hunting knife, injuring the 
victim's hand. This Court affirmed the conviction, 
stating: 
... It is true that the State was unable 
to prove directly what was in the defendant's 
mind relative to doing harm to the victim; 
and that he in fact denied having any such in-
tent. However, his version does not establish 
the fact, nor does it even necessarily raise 
sufficient doubt to vitiate the conviction. 
If it were so, it would lie within the power 
of a defendant to defeat practically any con-
viction which depended upon his state of mind. 
As against what he says, it is the jury's privi-
lege to weigh and consider all of the other facts 
and circumstances shown in evidence in determin-
ing what they will believe. This includes not 
only what was said and what was done, but also 
the conduct shown, which in this instance they 
may well have regarded as speaking louder than 
the defendant's later defensive claims as to 
what his intentions were. This is in accord 
with the elementary rule that a person is pre-
sumed to intend the natural and probable conse-
quences of his acts. 
22 Utah 2d at 378, 453 P.2d at 697. (emphasis added} 
Allowing the jury to make reasonable inferences 
from proven facts does not relieve the prosecution of its 
burden to prove all elements of an offense beyond a reason-
able doubt. The instruction that a person intends the reason-
able and ordinary consequences of his acts recognizes the fact 
that direct evidence of a person's intent is seldom avail-
able. As a result, intent, like any other fact, must often be 
-7-
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inferred from evidence of the surrounding circumstances, 
In the present case, the challenged instruction merely 
allowed the jury to reach reasonable conclusions based 
upon facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prose-
cution. 
It is well established that due process guaran-
tees require a criminal conviction to be based upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of the crime 
charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Accordingly, 
the ultimate test for judging the constitutional validi~ 
of a presumption is to determine whether it undermines "the 
factfinders' responsibility ... to find the ultimate facts 
beyond a reasonable doubt." County Court of Ulster City v. 
Allen, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224 (1979). The starting point in 
applying this test is to determine whether the presumption 
under review is perrni ssive or mandatory. A mandatory pre· 
surnption "tells the trier of fact that they must find 
the elemental fact based upon proof of the basic fact." 
99 S.Ct. at 2224. When a permissive inference is used, the 
prosecution does not rest its case entirely upon the pre· 
surnption but "may rely upon al 1 of the evidence in the 
record to meet the reasonable doubt standard." 
99 S.Ct. at 2229. 
-8-
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In the Ulster case, the United States Supreme 
Court upheld a New York statute which provided that the 
presence of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive 
evidence of its illegal possession by all persons occu-
pying the vehicle. The jury was instructed that, 
... upon proof of the presence of the 
machine gun and the hand weapons, you 
may infer and draw conclusions that such 
prohibitive /sic/ weapon was possessed 
by each of the defendants who occupied 
the automobile at the time such instru-
ments were found. The presumption .•• 
is effective only so long as there is 
no substantial evidence contradicting the 
conclusion flowing from the presumption, 
and the presumption is said to disappear when 
such contradictory evidence is adduced. 
99 s.ct. at 2227. The jury in Ulster was also instructed 
on the presumption of innocence, the necessity to find in-
tent coupled with constructive possession, and the need to 
find all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
99 S.Ct. at 2227. Despite the fact that the instruction 
called for the defendant to raise "substantial evidence" 
contradicting the presumed fact, the Court concluded that 
the inference was permissive since the jury instructions as 
a whole "directed the jury to consider all the circumstances 
tending to support or contradict the inference •.. ·" 
9 9 S . Ct . at 2 2 2 7 . 
-9-
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Having made this determination, the Supreme 
Court stated that the standard to be used in judging 
a permissive inference was whether, 
... There is a 'rational connection' be-
tween the basic facts that the prosecu-
tion proved and the ultimate fact pre-
sumed, and the latter is 'more likely than 
not to flow from' the former. 
99 S.Ct. at 2228. 
Respondent subrni ts the jury instruction that "a 
person intends the reasonable and ordinary consequences of 
his own acts" given in the present case created a perrnis-
s i ve inference which did not undermine the jury's duty to 
find all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Respondent further contends that this instruction satisfies 
the rational connection standard noted in Ulster, since, ur.· 
der the circumstances of this case, it is "more likely 
than not" that appellant's actions demonstrated his intent t: 
deprive another of property. 
Viewed as a whole, the jury instructions clearly· 
dicated that the presumption was to be treated as a perinis5 
inference. It is established by Utah law that jury instruc: 
must be reviewed in context. Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2° 
364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966); Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2dl6, 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
414 P. 2d 575 (1966). 
The appellant, however, base.s his contention 
upon one paragraph of one instruction which he alleges 
was improper and ignores the import of the instructions 
as a whole. The jury was carefully instructed upon the 
presumption of innocence, the need to find guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt (R.42), and the defenses available to 
the defendant. (R.45) Furthermore, language within the 
disputed instruction itself shows that the jury could not 
have interpreted the presumption as conclusive. First, 
the jury was instructed that the purpose to deprive meant 
to have the "conscious object to withhold property perma-
nently, or for so extended a period that a substantial por-
tion of its economic value .•. would be lost." It is not 
likely that a juror could conclude appellant had the ~­
scious ebject to deprive another of his property, simply 
because this resulted from his actions. Second, prior to 
directing that the law presumes a person intends the reason-
able and ordinary consequences of his acts, the Court stated 
that intent "must ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, 
statements and circumstances." (R.43) The effect of using 
presume and infer interchangeably would indicate to lay 
-11-
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jurors that they were free to accept or reject the pre-
sumption. The Court went on to state that the presump-
tion was rebuttable and could be overcome by evidence to 
the contrary. This instruction allowed the jury to re-
ject the presumption if any evidence to the contrary was 
presented. This burden is no greater than the burden of 
creating a reasonable doubt which always rests upon the 
defendant. Finally, the instruction states that "no per-
son is guilty of an offense unless ... he acts intentionall 
or knowingly." (R. 43) These instructions, as a whole, 
make it improbable that the jury could find appellant in-
tended to deprive another of property based solely on the 
presumption that he intended the consequences of his acts. 
The jury instructions in this case merely allowed the ju~: 
make reasonable inferences about appellant's intent based 
upon facts presented in the State's case. 
The permissive inference included in the jury ~ 
structions at issue satisfies the rational connection stanl· 
ard of the Ulster case, supra. Satisfaction of this stand· 
ard requires a showing that the fact presumed is "more 
likely than not to flow from" the facts that the prosec~ 
tion proved. 99 S.Ct. at 2228. In the present case, proof 
of appellant's acts indicates it is more likely than not he 
-12-
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acted with the purpose to permanently deprive another 
of property. First, after representing that money ob-
tained from Felger would be used to obtain certificates 
of deposit (CD's) to induce the lender to make a loan, 
appellant placed the funds in a private account. Second, 
within roughly two weeks of its deposit, most of the funds 
had been spent for private purposes, and no CD's had been 
obtained. Third, appellant had not repaid any portion 
of the money he received from Felger. It was more likely 
than not that the appellant's acts would result in Felger's 
being deprived of his property. Thus, there is a rational 
connection between the facts proved and the presumption 
that appellant intended to deprive Felger of his property. 
The appellant cites Sandstrom v. Montana, 99 S.Ct. 
2450 (1979),in support of his contention that, if the dis-
puted instruction could have been interpreted by a reason-
able jury to shift the burden of persuasion to the defense, 
the instruction violated due process guarantees. However, 
the instruction reviewed in Sandstrom is significantly dif-
ferent from the instruction in the present case. As the Court 
noted in Sandstrom, 
-13-
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Sandstrom's jurors were told that 'the 
law presumes that a person intends the 
ordinary consequences of his voluntary 
acts.' They were not told that they had 
a choice, or that they might infer that 
conclusion; they were told only that the 
law presumed it. 
The Court held that, since a reasonable juror could in-
terpret this instruction either as a mandatory presump-
tion or as a presumption shifting the burden of proving 
intent to the defense, it violated due process. 99 s.ct. 
at 2459-60. However, the Court expressly stated it was not 
reaching the question of the validity of a presumption 
when the jury is instructed that it may be rebutted 
by evidence to the contrary. 99 s.ct. at 2455. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reviewed the 
Sandstrom holding in the case of State v. Eagle, No. 16129 
(Utah Sup. Ct., May 6, 1980). In that case, the Court re-
viewed the instruction that: 
A person's state of mind is not always sus-
ceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence, and, if not, may ordinarily be in-
ferred from acts, conduct, statements, or cir-
cumstances. 
This Court concluded that, since the jurors were instructec 
that intent could be inferred rather than presumed, the in· 
struction was valid. Language similar to that reviewed in 
-14-
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State v. Eagle, supra, was included in the disputed 
instruction. Regardless of the fact that the Trial 
Court also used language of presumption, respondent 
submits that the instruction would clearly indicate to 
jurors that they could accept or reject the presump-
tion based upon all the evidence presented. 
The jury in the present case was also instructed 
that it was a defense to theft if the appellant "acted 
in the honest belief that he had a right to obtain or 
exercise control over the property." Accordingly, in 
reaching a guilty verdict, the jury weighed evidence sup-
porting the presumption against appellant's testimony that 
he had been authorized to use the funds for personal ex-
penses. Recognizing the jury's duty as finder of fact, 
this Court stated in State v. Coffey, 564 P.2d 777 (Utah 1977): 
.•. it is the responsibility of the jury 
to determine whether the elements of the crime 
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The court on appeal examines the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the verdict; 
and if it appears that the jury acted fairly 
and reasonably, the judgment will not be dis-
turbed. 
564 P.2d at 778-9. 
Based on the evidence offered by the State, the jury 
-15-
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reasonably concluded that the appellant's acts 
indicated his intent to deprive Dave Felger of his property. 
In conclusion, the instruction that a person is 
presumed to intend the reasonable and ordinary consequences 
of his own acts did not violate due process, since it was 
clearly intended to be a permissible inference and not the 
sole basis for finding intent. This permissive inferen~ 
satisfies the rational connection test given by the United 
States Supreme Court in the Ulster case, supra. Finally, e 
present instruction was not improper under the Supreme Cour: 
recent ruling in Sandstrom v. Montana, supra. 
POINT II 
THE JURY INSTRUCTION THAT APPELLANT COULD 
BE FOUND GUILTY OF THEFT IF HE ACTED IN-
TENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY WAS PROPERLY GIVEN. 
The appellant contends the Trial Court erred by 
giving a jury instruction that: 
In such a case as this, under the law, no 
person is guilty of an offense unless his 
conduct is prohibited by law and he acts 
intentionally or knowingly. A person acts 
intentionally under the law, either with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to 
the result of his conduct, when it is that 
persons's conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
A person acts knowingly when he is aware of 
the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances or that his conduct is reason-
ably certain to cause the result. (R. 43) 
-16-
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The appellant contends that, since the statutory 
definition of theft includes the specific intent ele-
ment of purpose to deprive another of his property, 
the jury should not have been instructed that the appel-
lant could be found guilty if he acted knowingly. The 
appellant further claims that this instruction made it 
possible for the jury to find appellant guilty if they 
concluded he engaged in reckless conduct which was reason-
ably certain to deprive another of his property. This 
instruction did not constitute error, and even if the 
Court had erred in giving the instruction, the error 
was harmless under the circumstances of this case. 
The appellant was charged with theft, which is 
defined in Section 76-6-404 of the Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
as amended, as follows: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to de-
prive him thereof. 
The Trial court instructed the jury on each ele-
rnent of the offense, defining purpose to deprive as, 
... to have the conscious object to with-
hold property permanently or for so ex~ 
tended a period or to use under such circum-
stances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost •.•. 
-17-
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The source of this definition is Utah Code Ann. Se 
tion 76-6-401 (1953), as amended. Inclusion of the 
statutory definition of purpose to deprive in the same 
instruction with the disputed language makes it im-
possible the jury could have found appellant guilty, 
based upon reckless conduct which was substantially cer-
tain to result in deprivation of another's property. In 
reaching a guilty verdict, it was necessary that the jucy 
find appellant acted with the conscious object to deprive 
another of property. In accordance with the jury ins true-
tions, such a conclusion necessarily would be based upon 
a finding appellant acted at least with awareness of t~ 
nature of his conduct, knowing that it was reasonably cer-
tain to result in depriving another of property. (R. 43) 
Thus, the conclusion that appellant had the purpose or 
conscious object to deprive another of property cannot, 
as appellant contends, rest upon a finding that he engaged 
in reckless conduct which was reasonably certain to result 
in deprivation of property. Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-H: 
(1953), as amended, states that a person acts recklessly, 
... when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that ... the result will occur. 
Acting in conscious disregard of a substantial risk does no: 
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approach the culpability of acting with the conscious 
object or purpose to deprive another of property 
permanently, or for an extended period. Therefore, ap-
pellant's contention that the disputed instruction al-
lowed the jury to base its verdict upon a showing of 
reckless conduct is without merit. 
Even if the disputed instruction had been given 
improperly, it was a harmless error since there was ample 
evidence that the appellant acted with the purpose to deprive 
another of property. The State's evidence showed that Felger gave 
appellant $11,700 for the express purpose of obtaining 
certificates of deposit. Appellant placed the funds in a 
private account and wrote checks for his personal use. 
No certificates of deposit were ever placed with the lender, 
and Felger has not been repaid. The evidence clearly shows 
that these acts were intended to or reasonably certain to 
deprive Felger of his property. The only evidence to the 
contrary was the appellant's testimony that he was told he 
could use the money for his expenses. The jury was also in-
structed on this theory of defense, and chose not to accept 
it. 
This Court encountered a similar claim in State v. 
Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976). The defendant in that case 
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was charged with theft of copper wire from telephone 
poles. The Trial Court instructed the jury that "no 
person is guilty of an offense unless .. he acts inten-
tionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negli-
gence ... II 
In reviewing this instruction on appeal, this 
Court stated: 
we concede that we do not see the appli-
cability of the terms 'recklessly or with 
criminal negligence' to the particular cir-
cumstances involved here. The critical issue 
of fact centered upon whether, as defendant 
Kazda said: There was a 'Mr. Johnson' who 
gave him a contract to remo\·e the wires, or 
whether, as other evidence showed, that story 
was a fiction protective of the defendant .... 
The jury whose prerogative it is to choose 
what evidence it will believe, chose to beliew 
that of the State. Despite defendant's brave 
efforts to make it appear to the contrary, we 
do not see how under the circumstances shown, 
and the other instructions given, the inclusion 
of the terms complained of could have been pre-
judicial to the defendant. 
545 P. 2d at 192. 
In the present case, the jury also chose to accec 
the State's version of the evidence. The appellant pre-
sented his defense to the jury and the jury was instruct~ 
on the law regarding mistake as a defense to theft. Never· 
the less, this testimony was not sufficient to raise a reasc 
able doubt in the minds of the jury. 
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The rule regarding reversible error was 
stated by this Court in Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 2d 
296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963), as follows: 
In order to justify reversal, the appellant 
must show error that was substantial and 
prejudicial in the sense there is at least 
a reasonable likelihood that in the absence 
of the error the result would have been dif-
ferent. 
383 P.2d at 408. 
For appellant to prevail on appeal, he must 
show that the Trial Court's instruction as to the neces-
sary intent for the offense was such prejudicial error 
that "there is at least a reasonable likelihood 8 that, 
excluding such an error, the result would have been dif-
ferent. In view of the substantial evidence showing the 
relationship between the appellant's acts and the result of 
depriving Felger of his property, the respondent submits 
that any alleged error in instructing the jury was harm-
less. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury instruction that a person presumes the 
reasonable and ordinary consequences of his acts did not 
result in a denial of due process under recent decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court, since this instruction, 
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viewed in context, created a permissive inference which 
did not undermine the jury's duty to base its verdict 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of 
the crime. 
The instruction that, in order to be guilty of 
theft, a person must act intentionally or knowingly was 
properly given since the jury was adequately instructed 
in all elements of the crime and given statutory defini-
tions of each element. For the foregoing reasons, the 
respondent urges this Court to affirm the conviction and 
sentence the accused. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney Ge~eral 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant A~torney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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